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A Solomonic Judgment on Elections in Iraq

JURIST Guest Columnist
Chibli Mallat,
professor of law at the University of Utah and Saint Joseph's
University, Lebanon, says that for the sake of stability in
Iraq's upcoming elections, it's imperative that all parties
respect the Iraqi judiciary's recent decision on candidate
eligibility....
It
took the US Supreme Court 180 pages to issue the controversial —
and by most accounts, poor — Citizens United decision
which equated corporations with individual human beings and
which threw overboard a carefully crafted bipartisan law meant
to reduce the power of money in US elections.
In its ‘Abd al-Amir decision of February 3, 2010, it took
the Iraqi Cassation Chamber ten lines to bring hope to an
endangered electoral process in Iraq. It was published on
February 4 on the
Higher Judicial Council's website,
and is available
here
in English.
I have
argued
that last month's Citizens United decision repeated the
ill-bent precedent of the infamous Bush v. Gore decision
of December 2000 in the sense that the judges appeared to act as
mere political agents for the parties of the presidents who
appointed each of them. At great cost to the judiciary's
credibility, both cases split down the middle politically, with
5 Republicans against 4 Democrats. Hence the finesse, in
contrast, of the Iraqi judiciary's ‘Abd al-Amir decision.
In an occasionally endearing ruling about the risk of being a
judge in a country like Iraq, the Cassation Chamber admitted the
appeals lodged by some 500 candidates on the basis of their
exclusion from the electoral lists. That exclusion was decreed
by the Accountability and Justice Committee on account of the
candidates' organic ties with the previous Baath regime. The
Court declared that it did not have time to examine the appeals,
and that while candidates had a constitutional right to run for
elections, the Court could cancel the results in case of success
if the 'democratic credentials' required by the anti-Baath law
had not been met.
At the origins of the electoral turmoil in Iraq was the
precedent created by the
botched Afghani presidential election,
which saw the rigging of the election of incumbent president
Hamid Karzai go unpunished.
Challenges to the stability of the electoral system in Iraq
started with the late approval of the electoral law on November
8, 2009. From the start, this appeared to be a harbinger of
fishy dealings because it left candidates with little time to
establish their tactics and coalition strategy. Then Tareq al-Hashimi
— one of the three members of the Iraqi Presidency Council —
unreasonably vetoed the law on November 18, pushing the date
beyond the January deadline requested by an earlier ruling of
the Federal Supreme Court. In a country with deep national and
sectarian divisions, this was perceived as a Sunni ploy —
Hashimi being Sunni. The unease was continued by rumblings of
the president of the Kurdish region, Mas'ud Barzani, who
threatened that same week to boycott the elections if certain
Kurdish demands were not met. This was perceived as a Kurdish
ploy. As soon as the date was finalized in the wake of a
last-minute compromise between Hashimi and the Kurds, the crisis
of the excluded candidates was set by the decision of the
Accountability and Justice Commission on 19 January 2010. Since
almost one-sixth of the candidates were excluded, the crisis
became national. This was perceived as a Shi'i ploy.
At the heart of the last crisis lie two conflicting basic
principles: the candidate's freedom to run, and the public's
right to be shielded from self-styled advocates of the Baath
system.
The Court rendered nothing less than a Solomonic judgment.
Tempers run high in elections, and Iraq is no exception. The
Accountability and Justice Commission certainly erred in
delaying the examination of candidates' credentials until so
late in the day, and disqualified too many people for its
decision not to appear excessive so close to the elections.
On the other hand, in a country where some politicians continue
to boast about a ruthless 'resistance' which continues to kill
dozens of innocent civilians at a time when American troops are
anxious to leave the country, there is a legitimate question as
to whether some of the unrepentant Baathists should be allowed
to use what they decry as "US-imposed democracy" to run for
elections. By holding that their democratic credentials might
still be examined after the elections, because it simply did not
have the time to thoroughly and professionally examine every
file, the Cassation Chamber achieved a Pyrrhic victory that
saves the elections, but only if its writ is widely accepted in
the country.
It should be. The Seven-member court was appointed by the Higher
Judicial Council on the request of Parliament in order to give
the candidates banned by the Commission the right to see their
appeals adjudicated in a court of law. The judges simply did not
have time to examine several hundred cases, nor did the law
allow them to accept candidates who supported or who continue to
support the members or advocates of the former regime, which was
rightly described by Tony Blair as "monstrous" in his recent
appearance before the Chilcot commission. Candidates whose
rights to run were reinstated should take the decision seriously
and should avoid triumphalism during the campaign. Similarly,
all factions in Iraq must abandon posturing and must run a
decent campaign which has for all intents and purposes fully
started, while the brutal bombings meant to derail them continue
and intensify.
When the ill-advised decision Bush v. Gore was issued,
losing candidate Al Gore expressed impressive democratic poise
when he stated on December 13, 2000: "Now the U.S. Supreme Court
has spoken." In a far better decision, Iraq should be shielded
from further uncertainties created by suspicious candidates and
parties who should now accept that the Iraqi Court has spoken.
The Iraqi judiciary gave Iraqis a respite which will only take
effect if its decision is appreciated for its extraordinary
humane and legal quality.
Chibli Mallat is professor of law at the University of Utah
and Saint Joseph's University, Lebanon. He is the author of
numerous studies on Iraq, including three books, The Renewal
of Islamic Law (Cambridge 1993), Dalil al-Dustur
al-‘Iraqi (‘Guide to the Iraqi Constitution’, Baghdad 2009)
and Iraq: Guide to Law and Policy, which has just
appeared at Aspen. He is a regular JURIST columnist and edits
the Lebanese Daily Star law page.
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