The Mehlis report on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, released on the night of October 20-21, while doubly provisional, was nonetheless immediately dramatic. The report was provisional because Detlev Mehlis' task was extended until mid-December. Technically also, the report was provisional. While a prosecutor by profession, Mehlis has acted chiefly as an international criminal investigator in the absence of an international tribunal that could act upon his findings. Indictments and arrests are not technically within his power, although he has "suggested" that the Lebanese judiciary arrest suspects, most notably four generals who were in charge of Lebanese security services at the time of the assassination. More arrests followed.

More dramatically, several top Syrian leaders have been called in to appear before Mehlis at his headquarters in Lebanon. It is not clear whether the Syrian government will oblige: A tug of war is developing between Damascus and the Mehlis team, with the UN Security Council unanimously requesting full Syrian cooperation in its Resolution 1636, which was passed under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The interim report was severe regarding Syria's leaders: "There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services."

Equally dramatic is the evidence pointing to the personal involvement of Syrian President Bashar Assad through his threats to the former prime minister. These threats had been reported by the former UN investigator, Irish police commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, but long quotes, including from Syrian officials, confirm the dramatic scene of the last brief encounter between Hariri and Assad on August 26, 2004. This is the political crux of the report, which results from Assad's decision to force Hariri and other Lebanese parliamentarians to extend the term of Lebanese president Emile Lahoud, despite Security Council Resolution 1559, which was passed a day before. That extension was approved on September 3, 2004.

The extension of Lahoud's presidency not only violated the Lebanese constitution and basic principles of democracy, but, in light of the Mehlis findings about the meeting of August 26, the Lebanese president sits in violation of international law, specifically of two clauses in Resolution 1559 requiring Lebanese elections to be free from foreign intervention.

Even Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa does not seem to deny the fact. In a letter to the UN, he wrote that the meeting between Assad and Hariri discussed "the possible extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the president of Lebanon, in view of the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon." Mehlis used the occasion to underline the Syrian foreign minister's inconsistencies: "While the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the Commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements. The letter addressed to the Commission by the foreign minister of the Syrian Arab Republic proved to contain false information."

On the purely criminal level, Mehlis partly uncovered the web of deceit carried out by the conspirators, and his most remarkable advances are based on the trail left by telephone calls, leading to the naming of over 20 individuals busy tracking down the itinerary of Hariri in the month preceding his murder. For Lahoud, who has politically survived the arrest of the four security officials, most troubling is the connection made with one suspect, whom, the report says, "made a call [nine] minutes before the blast, at 12:47 p.m., to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud." Lahoud was interrogated for six hours last week by the investigators.

These findings might take some more time to sink in. Their political impact depends on a highly volatile situation inside Lebanon, as well as in. Legally, the report offers two clear invitations: to follow up on various leads it has uncovered; and to look toward a trial with the active involvement of the UN.

The Security Council will have to decide whether an international tribunal should take on the case. Against the resistance of some Security Council members, including the United States government, to establish yet another ad hoc tribunal, all parties should consider the structural inadequacy of the Lebanese judiciary to take on the daunting task of a trial alone. A compromise to the contending demands of all sides may well be a mixed tribunal, like the one formed to judge crimes in Sierra Leone. Whatever the shape of the trial to come, any investigation will need to remain strongly anchored internationally, if only to reach beyond the Lebanese borders into Syria, as is required from the evidence uncovered.

Chibli Mallat, a lawyer and law professor, is presently running for the presidency of Lebanon. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.